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Abstract  
This paper explores Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) and the related security issues and 
complications arising from a specific type of security breach, the wormhole attack. Wormhole attacks 
against WSNs are classified as passive, external laptop-class threats. Because malicious wormhole 
attacks are increasing, these attacks pose a serious security threat and increase the costs to maintain a 
Wireless Sensor Network. Research into preventing wormhole attacks yields two distinct model approach 
types: Administrator-Viewpoint models and User-Viewpoint models. While the modalities vary, the four 
Administrator-Viewpoint models reviewed were designed in the early 2000s and suggest defending 
against wormhole attacks through the use of expensive hardware, packet leashes, or topology 
visualization systems. On the other hand, the four proposed User-Viewpoint models have become the 
current theoretical models of choice.  While existing as simulation approaches to defend against 
wormhole attacks, the User-Viewpoint models use internally calculated routing algorithms to suggest 
routes to avoid or evade, not defend against, established wormhole routes. This paper confirms the 
efficacies of the User-Viewpoint models in the lab simulations are viewed as the most promising cost-
effective, future security solutions to wormhole attacks. 
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1. Introduction 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are autonomous, spatially distributed nodes which function in hostile or remote 
environments to monitor physical or environmental conditions. These nodes work cooperatively to identify and 
solve problems through nodal localization (Honglong, Wei, Xice, & Zhi, 2010).  For the most part, these wireless 
sensor networks forego any fixed infrastructure in favor of an ad-hoc topology utilizing various types of unattended 
wireless communication channels (Sharma and Bhadana, 2010). WSNs were originally devised to handle military 
applications, perform border surveillance, or monitor battlefield conditions (Mahadevi, 2011). In response to the 
successful military outcomes achieved, in recent years, civilian applications such as healthcare and environmental 
monitoring, traffic control, and home security automation have abounded (Meghdadi, Ozdemir, & Guler, 2011). 
With each new advancement in integrated circuit and sensor technology, wireless sensing devices have become less 
expensive, but, at the same time, these devices have increased in overall capabilities and, surprisingly, in the 
security risks posed to users (Jagadeesan, 2016). While WSNs are vulnerable to a wide variety of security attacks, 
this paper gives an overview of the components of WSNs, defines key terms, addresses the threats posed to wireless 
sensor networks by wormhole attacks, and suggests potential or proposed security schemes to forestall wormhole 
attacks and the resulting damage to network hardware, systems, and data.  
2. Wireless Sensor Networks  
Wireless Sensor Networks differ from traditional wireless networks. WSNs consist of a hierarchical, three-layered 
architecture and three sensor node types. WSNs are a form of distributed information aggregation system. Unlike 
traditional wireless networks, WSNs are limited in energy, communication capabilities, memory, and computational 
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abilities. As a result, a WSN’s reliability and precision are considered to be less reliable and precise than a 
traditional wireless network. At the heart of a WSN are three types of densely deployed nodes for collaboratively 
sensing, processing data, and communicating information and results. The three types of nodes are sensor nodes 
(SN), forwarding nodes (FN), and access points (AP). These nodes have the capability to freely roam within a 
widely dispersed network. Individual nodes essentially transmit data and serve as information routers for other 
nodes (Qiu, Zhou, Baek, & Lopez, 2010).  
According to Sharma and Bhadana (2010), sensor nodes are low power, have limited functionality, and are not 
individually capable of multi-hop routing. These nodes tend to be application specific to monitor temperature, 
video, or pressure. Most often, sensor nodes are grouped in clusters and sited at strategic locations. Sensor nodes 
monitor applications or provide surveillance to send back to the local forwarding nodes (FN). For each sensor node 
cluster, there is an individual forwarding node (FN). Forwarding nodes receive the sensor node cluster information 
and then process the information to obtain aggregate results. These nodes also verify the information received from 
the SN cluster. This “middle man” node consists of two wireless interfaces between the lower level sensor nodes 
and the next higher level of node, the access points (AP). Possessing both wired and wireless interfaces, access 
points (AP) utilize its multi-hop routing capabilities to send SN and FN packets to wired networks within a 
designated radio range as well as to forward control information between SNs and FNs and wired networks. APs 
also are capable of re-verifying the information previously verified at the FN node level.  
At each of these node points, protected and authenticated communication between the various sensor nodes are key 
security concerns. WSN sensor node vulnerabilities arise from four separate areas: the open nature of wireless 
channels, the absence of infrastructure, its rapid speed of deployment, and hostile deployment environments (Tun 
and Maw, 2008). Due to these four vulnerabilities, security protocols centered solely around physical security 
cannot be successfully used. Security only becomes more critical against security attacks because sensor nodes are 
heavily constrained and limited in terms of its internal energy, memory, computational and communication abilities. 
Because it’s routing paths and relative neighborhood are subject to constant change, networks frequently cannot 
provide adequate security measures against posed threats such as breaches in confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication, and authorization (Bankovic, Fraga, Moya, & Vallejo, 2012). There is little or no capability to 
identify new threats or impending attacks and to react proactively to prevent damage. Security, then, becomes a 
paramount concern because roaming nodes have to constantly be authenticated within neighboring nodes through 
secure communication keys.    
 Attacks on WSNs can be categorized as passive or active and internally-sourced versus externally-sourced attacks. 
More specifically, there are two view levels of attacks: security mechanism attacks and basic mechanism attacks. 
Major attacks can consist of wormhole attacks, spoofing, selective forwarding, black-holes or sinkholes, Sybil 
attacks, HELLO flooding, and denial of service Of these attack sources, wormhole attacks, the focus of this paper, 
constitute one of the highest continuing threats to WSNs (He, Ma, Wang, & Fang, 2009). Wormhole attacks are 
malicious, passive, external laptop-class threats. In a wormhole attack, at least two colluding nodes maliciously 
“create a higher-level virtual tunnel (wormhole) in the network and transport message packets between the tunnel 
endpoints” (Kumar, Waheed, & Basappa, 2010) by offering shorter network links. Unsuspecting nodes are deceived 
into selecting the shorter routes and replaying the message in a separate part of the network and corrupting data or 
disabling networks through faulty information. Wormhole tunnels can be established through wired infrastructure 
links or hidden within out-of-band channels, through high powered transmission lines, or through packet 
encapsulation above network layers. 
3. Analysis of Prevention Methods   
Generally, research into wormhole attack prevention centered on two approaches: Administrator-Viewpoint models 
and User-Viewpoint models. Each of these approaches was examined to determine its focus, strengths, and 
weaknesses. In addition, these approaches constituted a representative sample of the multitude of theories, 
approaches, and models used to address wormhole attack security issues within the information technology 
industry. 
In the Administrator-Viewpoint models, designers tried to identify actual wormholes and then create systems or 
processes to defend against the attack. Most often, these involved creating models, signal processing antennas, 
packet leashes, or topology visualization systems (Shang-Ming, Chi-Sung, & Wen-Chung, 2009). The 
Administrator-Viewpoint models include the Multi-Dimensional Scaling-Visualization of Wormhole (MDS-VOW) 
(Wang and Bhargava, 2004), the Graph Theoretical Approach using a Local Broadcast Key (LBK) (Lazos, 
Poovendran, Meadows, Syverson, & Chang, 2005), the initial TESLA with Instant Key (TIK) protocol model (Hu, 
Perring, & Johnson, 2003), and later TIK protocol models using Tree Cast architecture (Kumar et al., 2010).  
In comparison, the second group of approaches, the User-Viewpoint approaches, utilized routing information and 
implemented an “avoidance” system whereby at-risk routes were bypassed or evaded. Most often, the techniques 
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suggested were Hop-count analysis, the Thread Model, and Elliptical Curve Pairing (Rahman and El-Khatib, 2009), 
and a distance-consistency- approach based secure localization protocol. All of the User-Viewpoint approaches 
were and remain theoretical, proposed models or laboratory simulations. 
The TIK Packet leashes approach utilizes an extended version of the TESLA authentication protocol for instant 
authentication of broadcast communications and temporal leashes over sensor networks. Packet leashes attempt to 
span the distances that messages can travel using geographical and temporal leashes. Geographical leashes group 
certain packet recipients within a defined distance from a sender. Temporal leashes, on the other hand, established a 
maximum travel distance and set upper lifetime boundaries. Critical to this model was the assumption that all sensor 
nodes recognized its independent location and then embedded a time and site location stamp within each sent 
packet. With network synchronization, these special packets easily ferreted out wormholes based on time and 
location anomalies; however, if synchronization failed, the methodology was not useful (Rani and Kumar, 2017).    
MDS-VOW, A type of topology visualization system advanced by Wang and Bhargava (2004), employed the use of 
sensor network nodes within a network’s topology to detect wormholes through multidimensional scaling. Based on 
signal strength, distances between sensors were estimated and mapped by a central controller. The central controller 
calculated the overall physical topology based on the distance measurements between sensors. Anomaly-free areas 
presented as flat while wormholes presented as a string-like structure connecting the network edges. This system 
was most effective for centralized networks and was hardware intensive.   
The Graph Theoretical Approach focused on communication range capabilities and utilized a local broadcast key 
(LBK). The LBK enabled a secure ad-hoc network via guard and regular nodes. Through localizing broadcast keys’ 
encrypted transmissions, guard nodes accessed data location and broadcast the location to regular nodes. Using the 
guard beacons, the regular nodes calculated a sensor’s location.  Any abnormal transmissions arising from 
wormhole attackers could easily be distinguished and isolated. Time delays were graphed and delay times were 
calculated using special localization equipment (Lazos et al., 2005). Any delays more than twice the radius between 
nodes were deemed an anomaly.  This system’s major weakness was that all guard nodes must be able to know 
exact locations at all times. It was most suited for a stationary dense sensory network. Seven years after the initial 
TIK protocols were implemented, Kumar et al. (2010) suggested an updated TIK stateless architecture with 
disclosed public values and symmetric cryptography called Tree Cast. This stateless architecture was facilitated by 
the technology advances in low-power and low-cost wireless sensors. Multiple disjointed message trees created 
geographically intertwined and rooted address allocations in a data sink. The trees routed messages back and forth 
to the data sink; however, no sensor node routing states were required. Received packet leashes provided instant 
authentication using only a modest storage size and computational overhead. 
In the Hop-count approach (Shang-Ming et al., 2009), the authors formulated a Multipath Hop-count Analysis 
(MHA), a type of wormhole attack detection scheme which does not require any unique or specialized assumptions 
about the environment. Instead, it utilized existing routing information established under RFC 3561 to create a 
multi-path routing protocol which seeks to avoid, not identify, wormholes. The basic premise was that 
communication pairs normally hold 5-6 hops while wormhole routes have two hops. Avoiding the smaller hop-
count routes will result in avoidance of most wormhole attacks through a four stage process: route establishment, 
gray-list broadcasts, the hop-count analysis scheme, and route maintenance. In this simulation, safe routes were 
established through processing packets. Routes with too few or too high hop-count levels were deemed risky and 
flagged or gray-listed. Low hop-count levels inferred the presence of a wormhole. On the other hand, high hop-
count levels indicated a risk of transmission deceleration or potential for route breakage. Packets which failed to 
meet the criteria of a normal route are flagged or gray-listed. Based on this information, the hop-count analysis 
scheme was derived to establish legal routes authority to transmit data. Finally, route maintenance ensured that 
broken routes are repaired or deleted and that data packets reach a desired destination via repaired routes or newly 
re-routed avenues. A Hop-count Analysis Scheme did not require any special environments and operated efficiently 
with lower overhead costs than traditional Administrator-Viewpoint models.  
Another type of wormhole detection approach encompassed detecting and preventing wormhole attacks altogether 
(He et al., 2009).  This simple yet effective method to locate wormholes by using an algorithm to identify known 
locations of beacon nodes. These nodes take on the role of wormhole or anomaly detectors. At the same time, 
sensor nodes aid in hop counting or finding the minimum number of hop jumps or transmissions between beacon 
nodes. Once a standard hop size is calculated via the algorithmic formula, any abnormalities or abnormity would be 
located via probe and alarm messages and then isolated. The key benefits derived from this algorithm were low 
calculation costs and reduced localization errors.       
Rahman and El-Khatib (2009) postulated that advances in Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) made it feasible to 
incorporate ECC within wireless sensor networks. Identity-based encryption (IBE) and paired based cryptography 
enabled a single bit of data to identify users and then exchange keys and encrypt the information. Under this 
proposed model, nodes were capable of dynamically altering IDs and secret locations. Authenticating shared keys 
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through low-latency links without preloading nodes’ shared keys was a major advantage of the model. Because 
packet information would prescribe a route, only trusted member-neighbors were accepted, therefore, wormhole 
attacks would not be permitted. Hence, key space and communication overhead were reduced compared to other 
communication models.  
The Distance-Consistency-Based Secure Localization Scheme theorized that wormhole detection, self-localization, 
and locator identification were the three foundations for the distance-consistency-based secure localization scheme 
used for defending against wormhole detection [1]. The purpose of the localization scheme was to calculate the 
probability and effectiveness of detecting an attack using a three-pronged deployment of sensors, locators, and 
attacker nodes. Mathematical models then calculated the probabilities of attack detection and finding the V-locator 
nodes distances. Secure localization outperformed other models and was extremely cost effective since no hardware 
was required. 
4. Results 
In 2003, the first serious attempts to address wormhole attacks were initiated. All of these working solutions and 
research initiatives sought to control the malicious data packets from traveling between nodes. Detecting and 
correcting WSN security issues arising from wormholes begins with node localization, however, the modalities or 
approaches vary widely. While identifying exact node locations is not always feasible and is certainly cost 
prohibitive, suggest that wormhole detection costs are generally proportional to the level of protection provided, 
therefore, security assessments tend to be short-sighted and fail to address a comprehensive approach to meeting 
security attacks and denial of the root sources of attacks within an established security framework.    
The Administrator-Viewpoint approaches are all currently deployed wormhole defense methodologies. The Packet 
Leashes Approach, MDS-VOW model, the Graph Theoretical Approach, and Tree Cast are all heavily dependent 
on significant expenditures for hardware, antennas, specialized localization equipment, and packet leashes, as well 
as for manpower costs in analyzing the scaling and mapping features of node location.  Knowing the location of 
nodes is key to these models, therefore, a major weakness of these models lies in failure of node synchronization or 
authentication. All of these early approaches seek to defend against wormhole attacks once a system is threatened or 
has been attacked, therefore, these models only serve to react to existing problems and have no scheme to avoid the 
attacks altogether.      
The User-Viewpoint approaches all represent theoretical models or simulations designed to avoid wormhole attacks 
through multi-path routes, hopping, and locator encryption coupled with range localization. The Multipath Hop-
count Analysis, the Thread Model, Elliptical Curve Pairing, and Secure Localization Approach represent significant 
trends in wormhole avoidance techniques. Each of these theoretical models and simulations offers significant cost 
savings since hardware and special equipment is not needed. Instead, since each of these models relies on 
mathematical equations and algorithms, the overall calculation cost remains low. The greatest downside to the 
overall User-Viewpoint models is that these methods have not undergone “real world” testing for practicality and 
usability. 
5. Conclusion  
With its spatially distributed nodes used to monitor physical and environmental conditions in hostile or unattended 
sites, Wireless Sensor Networks represent a major means of sensing, processing, and communicating data results 
for military and civilian purposes and applications. Because data is being transmitted and shared, basic security 
issues such as authentication, integrity, confidentiality, and availability arise. While a variety of threats can be 
mounted against WSNs, wormhole attacks represent one of the major threats to a wireless sensor network’s 
security. Wormhole attacks result from the compromising of two or more sensor nodes.  Data is intercepted and re-
sent to a malicious user, therefore, addressing the source and type of wormhole attacks is critical and time-sensitive. 
This paper delineated between Administrator-Viewpoint and User-Viewpoint models. Realistically, the 
Administrator-Viewpoint models are tested and have been deployed in industry for at least seven years; however, 
these solutions come at a high cost in terms of hardware and manpower used. On the other hand, the User-
Viewpoint models are more recent, but represent a trend toward more cost-effective solutions that rely on 
mathematical calculations and algorithms. While each of these offers a solution, currently, there is no one all-
inclusive answer to forestalling or preventing security issues within wireless sensor networks.  
Wormholes are just one of a plethora of security issues or attacks against a network. Resources within industry are 
limited, therefore, it is highly likely that wormhole attack solutions will be studied, but it will be studied in an 
overarching scheme of preventing most kinds of security breaches. The most likely scenario is that a business will 
find the existing solution which suits its individual needs and is cost-effective.  
Research in Wireless Sensor Network security abounds. A promising area of research is combining the two 
approaches under one umbrella: detection and avoidance of wormholes (Shabana, Fida, Khan, Jan, & Rehman, 
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2016). In this hybrid approach an outlier detection algorithm is used to identify, locate, and screen outlier nodes. An 
outlier detection algorithm accomplishes an increased outlier detection rate, an improved accuracy rate, and a higher 
total transmission energy consumption rate average per node. In addition, symmetric encryption and authentication 
codes aid in data confidentiality, authentication, and integrity of aggregated data.  
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